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 Peter Hughes 
NATO and the EU: Managing the Frozen 
Conflict 
Test Case Afghanistan 
Introduction 
The new, global international security threats of the twenty-first century, 
including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), failed states, energy security, and cyber terrorism, among others, 
have drastically affected, challenged, and changed the transatlantic rela-
tionship that existed during the Cold War. With the fall of the Soviet Un-
ion, the future role and relevance of the major forum for transatlantic 
security policy and relations (and the primary instrument for strategic con-
sensus-building within the transatlantic community), the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), was called into question; however it was 
able to find a new mission in integrating the former communist countries of 
Eastern Europe into the West. Following the 9/11/2001 attacks on the 
United States (US), the future of NATO was once again called into ques-
tion as the Bush administration downplayed the importance and role of 
NATO for US policy. More recently, however, the Bush administration has 
sought to reconcile differences and strengthen transatlantic relations by 
demonstrating its commitment to the Alliance, especially its support for the Peter Hughes 
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critical United Nations (UN) mandated NATO International Security Assis-
tance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan.
1 
At the same time as these developments in transatlantic relations have 
taken place, the member states of the European Union (EU), led mainly by 
France, have sought to increase the role of the EU as an organization in se-
curity and defense policy. This EU development has led to US concerns 
and further strains in the transatlantic relationship since some countries, 
notably France, see the EU as a competitor potentially able to rival 
NATO’s power and influence. Such concerns have basis since France’s 
Gaullist tradition has consistently been to diminish American political, eco-
nomic, and military influence in Europe and to compete with the US glob-
ally. Other European powers, and Germany in particular, have sought to 
assuage American fears by arguing that NATO and EU security policies 
can and should be complementary. 
Although there are many points of contention between NATO (the United 
States) and the EU regarding security and defense policy, it should be be-
yond dispute that in order to respond to and effectively deal with the new 
conflicts of the twenty-first century, it is essential that NATO (the US) and 
the European Union maintain and further integrate their transatlantic de-
fense capabilities through increased cooperation; it is not in the interest of 
the West that NATO and the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP) compete and constrain each other’s potential. Citing Afghanistan 
as a clear example of the interdependency of NATO and the EU, NATO 
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has argued:  
“Our success there depends not on military “victory” in the traditional sense. It 
depends on whether we succeed in creating a secure environment for political and 
economic development. NATO can create that environment, but cannot do more. 
NATO does not have the civil means to drive reconstruction forward, and we also 
have no interest at all in acquiring such means. It is the EU that has such means. 
For that reason it can, together with other civil players, give decisive impetus to 
 
1   As Karl Kaiser has written, “feeling the limits of U.S. power, President George 
Bush has rediscovered the value of allies and has once again acknowledged the im-
portance of the previously neglected NATO alliance, particularly in dealing with 
Afghanistan.” “Not Quite Quiet on the Western Front,” AICGS Advisor, 22 June 
2007. NATO and the EU: Managing the Frozen Conflict 
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reconstruction. In other words, the two institutions are dependent upon one an-
other.”
2 
In a similar vein, and unafraid of hyperbole, the EU High Representative 
for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, has ar-
gued that transatlantic relations are “almost perfect.”
3 However, the rheto-
ric of diplomats seems far removed from the reality. As the Economist’s 
Euro-observer, Richard Charlemagne, cynically writes, 
“In the post-cold-war model of saving the world, conflicts will be suppressed, and 
countries rebuilt, by alliances of alliances. International bodies will move into a 
conflict zone and parcel out the problem according to their expertise. The United 
Nations will supply legitimacy; NATO will break the furniture; the European Un-
ion will organize a trip to the nearest IKEA and provide development and political 
support; the Council of Europe will monitor elections; and the World Bank and 
assorted NGOs will do their thing.”
4  
Nerves, in fact, are frayed on both sides of the Atlantic, and the French and 
Americans have, until the recent election of French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy, maintained pensive mistrust of one another. The legitimacy of 
ESDP and the relationship between NATO and the European Union may 
well represent the foundation for transatlantic security in the twenty-first 
century, but the skepticism towards the dynamics of this transatlantic rela-
tionship remains. 
In a speech in January 2007, NATO’s Secretary General openly critiqued 
the continued evolution of this transatlantic strategic partnership, not so 
subtly referring to it as a “frozen conflict” and saying,  
“When one looks at how diverse and complex the challenges to our security have 
become today, it is astounding how narrow the bandwidth of cooperation between 
NATO and the Union has remained. Despite many attempts to bring the two insti-
tutions closer together, there is still a remarkable distance between them.”
5 
One can make a case that NATO-EU, and thus transatlantic-ESDP, rela-
tions have currently reached a stalemate or a “truce”, but some argue that 
“despite protestations on both sides about the blissful harmony of transat-
 
2   Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, “NATO and the EU: Time for a New Chapter,” 29 January 
2007, <www.nato.int>. 
3   Richard Charlemagne, “Transatlantic Tensions,” The Economist, 4 April 2007. 
4   Richard Charlemagne, “Berlin Minus,” The Economist, 10 February 2007. 
5   De Hoop Scheffer, “NATO and the EU.” Peter Hughes 
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lantic ties, relations between two of the rich world’s most important or-
ganizations have practically broken down.”
6 Why are ESDP-NATO trans-
atlantic relations so problematic, why is there a “frozen conflict” with little 
progress in political and institutional relations, and why does a sense of 
competition continue to persist, making it difficult to achieve an actual 
“strategic partnership” in reality? 
One often heard explanation is that the ESDP-NATO transatlantic relation-
ship remains largely unclear and undefined due to a “clash of world 
views.”
7  Another frequent explanation is that France does not want Europe 
to be considered a “toolbox” for US operations and has increasingly sought 
to define and develop its own policies and capabilities through the ESDP, 
hoping “to build up the EU into a defense force that can treat with America 
on equal terms (forget the discrepancy in military spending for a mo-
ment).”
8  It has “an interest in sidelining NATO to strengthen European 
influence vis a vis the United States.”
9 De Hoop Scheffer describes this 
situation saying,  
“Some deliberately want to keep NATO and the EU at a distance from one an-
other. For this school of thought, a closer relationship between NATO and the EU 
means excessive influence for the USA. Perhaps they are afraid that the European 
Security and Defense Policy is still too new and too vulnerable for a partnership 
with NATO. And time and again I hear the argument that the EU is a superior 
form of an institution compared to the purely intergovernmental NATO, for which 
reason the very idea of a genuine strategic partnership between the two is mis-
guided…NATO does not integrate, it coordinates. And it coordinates rather well – 
above all in a framework that includes the USA, without which security in our 
world is unthinkable. This fact makes NATO a unique forum. I do not share 
European instinctive fears about undue influence of the USA in European affairs 
anyhow. Europe is sufficiently self-aware – and they know it in Washington too.
10 
US policy makers generally are, nonetheless, concerned that independent 
actions of the EU through the ESDP will weaken NATO and adversely af-
 
6   Charlemagne, “Berlin Minus.” 
7   ibid. 
8   ibid. 
9   Michele A. Flournoy and Julianne Smith, European Defense Integration: Bridging 
the Gap Between Strategy and Capabilities, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, October 2005. 
10   De Hoop Scheffer, “NATO and the EU.” NATO and the EU: Managing the Frozen Conflict 
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fect Alliance security policies. As former Clinton Administration Deputy 
Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, notes, the US does not want to see an 
ESDP “that comes into being first within NATO but then grows out of 
NATO and finally grows away from NATO.”
11 
The Franco-American tug of war has led some to argue that “the two or-
ganizations are engaged in a hidden Darwinian struggle, a zero-sum game 
in which what is good for NATO is bad for the EU.”
12 Despite such con-
flict, the relevant question becomes: Is it possible to manage this conflict 
and move forward, especially concerning current operations in countries 
like Afghanistan, given both the competitive and complementary nature of 
NATO-EU policies, strategies, and capabilities? 
In this context the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, the UN mandated 
NATO ISAF mission on the ground, and EU-ESDP support initiatives may 
well offer a test case. In what has been called NATO’s “true test of credi-
bility,” the outcome of the NATO mission in Afghanistan and its ability to 
work with the newly established EU police mission there, will have impor-
tant implications for the futures of both institutions. As Julian Lindley 
French writes, “those Europeans who talk about Afghanistan presaging the 
demise of NATO had better clear their woolly minds, for such a failure 
would also put an end to any hope of effective and relevant European de-
fence.”
13 
Competing Franco-American Views 
Despite the growing thaw in Franco-American relations that has come with 
Sarkozy, it remains to be seen what this might mean for the “frozen con-
flict” in ESDP-NATO transatlantic relations.
14 There is a fundamental dif-
 
11   Johannes Varwick, “EU and NATO: A still undefined relationship,” World Security 
Network Newsletter. 10 January 2007. 
12   Charlemagne, “Berlin Minus.” 
13   Julian Lindley-French, “‘Afghanistan-lite’: The Crunch,” Afghanistan: Mission 
Impossible? European Security Forum, Working Paper No. 25, April 2007, 13. 
14  It is important to note that some practical operational barriers, namely the Turkey 
(NATO member) – Cyprus (EU member) dispute, have also contributed to the 
stalemate in relations by hampering effective NATO-ESDP cooperation regarding Peter Hughes 
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ference between the Franco-US approach to NATO. From the German 
point of view, a more neutral position, neither approach is absolutely better 
nor worse. They have been fundamentally different, and they have been the 
two countries in NATO with a strategic vision. The Gaullist view embod-
ied by the Quai d’Orsay has been that NATO has outlived its era and is on 
a slippery slope taking on too many new security threats and challenges, 
making it an unwieldy multipurpose tool that cannot effectively cope with 
all of its new tasks. In this Franco-Gaullist view, NATO, in its current form 
as a structure for meeting future challenges, has been dying…slowly, but 
dying nonetheless. Whether Sarkozy’s Elysee can institutionally change 
this historic Franco-Gaullist policy, again, has yet to be determined. How-
ever, as Sarkozy in his recent speech before the US Congress made clear, 
France sees improved ESDP capabilities as the precursor to its possible re-
turn to NATO. There are common transatlantic values and there is univer-
sal recognition of the current security threats. However, the level and type 
of response to these threats has no consensus; and in the Francophilian 
view, they require more complex responses and civil-military tools than the 
NATO Alliance can deliver. Therefore, the traditional Gaullist Quai 
d’Orsay French policy has advocated a new relationship between the US 
and EU within NATO which would make the EU an equal partner, and 
which would place less emphasis on individual EU member states’ bilateral 
relations with the US. This also appears to be the policy of Sarkozy. If such 
policies prevail, ESDP will bring full autonomy in defense policy and ca-
pability for the EU, and some fear that such a development could funda-
mentally erode NATO’s current structure. 
The Franco-Gaullist view espouses the development of a new NATO struc-
ture based on genuine partnership and which includes an EU caucus within 
NATO. The US and transatlantic-minded Europeans are extremely wary of 
such developments, viewing them as merely a French attempt to establish 
its influence to become the dominant voice in European security and de-
fense policy. Despite this struggle, however, the transatlantic relationship 
on a country-to-country, transatlantic bilateral basis, continues to flourish. 
 
the exchange of sensitive information (Turkey uses its veto to prohibit Cypriot dip-
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There are, of course, political and cultural differences regarding security 
and defense institutions, policies, capabilities, and types of force projection 
and conflict resolution across the Atlantic, as numerous European polls 
continue to show. However, there appears little need to fear what Robert 
Kagan (Of Paradise and Power) argues, that there is an ever-increasing 
disappearance of the cohesiveness of transatlantic relations following the 
end of the Cold War. De Hoop Scheffer argues persuasively, 
“At least the logic of a European Security and Defense Policy is not in dispute to-
day. The ESDP has meanwhile become an inseparable part of European integra-
tion. And it is – as the Union’s [2004] Constitutional Treaty provides – 
compatible with the Alliance’s common security and defense policy. Even the 
USA, after some initial hesitation, has acknowledged that this process is right and 
important – and that an ESDP must be seen as an opportunity, not a danger. And 
no one today would still seriously assert that NATO and the EU are rivals whose 
aim is to drive each other out of business.”
15 
NATO and the ESDP are, in fact, here to stay. Despite successes, both in-
stitutions are struggling to find direction, however, and their competing vi-
sions for the future are fueling these transatlantic tensions. Considering 
these strains, and similar and contrasting NATO and ESDP policies and 
capabilities, the question remains whether the “frozen conflict” can be 
managed effectively and contribute to the success and implementation of 
NATO and EU missions, notably in Afghanistan, which is vital for the se-
curity of the West as a whole. 
Renewed Attention to NATO-ESDP Cooperation 
Is it possible to build a complementary NATO-EU security architecture?  
Considering the difference in capabilities between NATO and the ESDP, 
the answer must be yes, and Sarkozy’s election as France’s new President 
may remove the Gaullist Quai d’Orsay obstacle that has, until now, proved 
so formidable. Nonetheless, the devil will be in the detail, and Sarkozy’s 
many pronouncements on the subject portend divisive issues within Europe 
and across the Atlantic. Recent speeches given by NATO’s de Hoop Schef-
fer and the EU’s Solana have drawn renewed attention to the potential im-
 
15   De Hoop Scheffer, “NATO and the EU.” Peter Hughes 
10   
portance of both NATO and the ESDP. The EU’s European Security Strat-
egy (ESS), developed in 2003, stresses not only the critical role of the US 
and NATO in security and defense policy but also calls upon Europe to 
take more responsibility in these matters and to play a more global role: 
“The United States has played a critical role in European integration and security, 
in particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War has left the United States in 
a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is able to 
tackle today’s complex problems on its own. Europe still faces security threats 
and challenges…and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the Euro-
pean Union is inevitably a global player.”
16 
Both NATO and the EU have identified similar key threats to international 
security:  these are common global challenges. If the EU wants to be a 
global player, it must take on such global responsibilities, and that means it 
cannot be confined to take action solely within the borders of Europe. As 
set forth in the ESS, “In an era of globalization, distant threats may be as 
much a concern as those that are near at hand…terrorists and criminals are 
now able to operate world-wide.”
17 The EU, then, must have a vested inter-
est in the success of operations in Afghanistan; a secure and stable Af-
ghanistan is central to Europe’s own stability and security. 
Similarly, NATO missions cannot be confined to Europe or only to the de-
fense of an Alliance member which has been attacked, NATO’s original 
purpose of collective security under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
of 1949, modified as it was in response to 9/11, notwithstanding. NATO 
must be able to tackle global threats to transatlantic security. 
Beyond expanded roles geographically, the new asymmetrical global 
threats require new, varied military and civilian policies, capabilities, and 
responses. NATO has well-developed conventional military capabilities 
and is in the process of military transformation and modernization to meet 
these new challenges and threats. However, many military operations also 
require reconstruction and peacekeeping elements, and the civil-military 
capabilities being developed by the ESDP offer potentially complementary 
 
16  European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, <http://www.consilium. 
eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>. 
17   ibid. 
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capabilities to many NATO missions. Through the Berlin Plus agreement 
of 2003, the ESDP’s civil-military capabilities also allow the EU to con-
duct its own military operations with NATO military support (equipment 
and personnel) in situations where NATO or the US is unwilling or unable 
to act. Since, as the ESS acknowledges, the EU has the potential to be well-
equipped to respond to multi-faceted situations, it will be essential that it 
assume a more active, responsible role in security missions, domestic popu-
lar and political opposition notwithstanding. However, ESDP rhetoric is 
currently more advanced than ESDP capabilities or EU member states’ po-
litical willingness to put troops in harm’s way, or to even spend adequate 
funds to develop such capabilities. The EU, through its institutions and 
broad array of competencies in political, economic, and developing foreign 
policy levels, could add great value through contributions to civilian capa-
bilities in areas that NATO lacks. However, dangers arise when the EU de-
velops its own ESDP military capabilities, which come at the expense of 
NATO since European countries continue to prove unwilling to meet their 
commitments to NATO in Afghanistan. Issues of duplication and overlap-
ping capabilities, and the question of funding, when many joint NATO-EU 
members already do not meet their NATO requirements for defense spend-
ing and commitments to ongoing operations, especially in Afghanistan, are 
emblematic of the current problems and their seriousness. With the goals 
and objectives of the ESS, set out in the semblance of a mission statement, 
why shouldn’t NATO and the EU be able to efficiently act together to ad-
dress a more distant threat to transatlantic security, as evident in the con-
flict in Afghanistan?  The problems lie in creating actual, functioning 
policies to give substance to the rhetoric, and to make cooperation feasible 
on political institutional and practical military levels. 
The war in Iraq has certainly exacerbated the NATO-ESDP tension.
18 
There has been a political and cultural “clash between the US’ needs and 
Europe’s interests,” and there has been a view that NATO was increasingly 
serving a “non-European purpose, that of ‘force multiplier’ and ‘toolbox’ 
for supporting US military intervention outside of Europe…with question-
 
18   Cf. Jens van Scherpenberg, “For Europe, a heavier security burden,” International 
Herald Tribune, 14 November 2006. Peter Hughes 
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able benefit to Europe”.
19  Politically, these developments have been detri-
mental. Nonetheless, the proposed US missile defense system in Europe 
notwithstanding, relations within NATO, and US bilateral relations with 
European countries generally, have certainly improved from their 2003 na-
dir. Over the past two years many European leaders have emphasized the 
importance of NATO as the premier forum for transatlantic security and 
defense policy and how it should develop in the future alongside a 
strengthened ESDP. In a speech in the fall of 2006, then British Prime Min-
ister Tony Blair said, 
“We [Britain] need America. That is a fact…for Britain, it is always right for us to 
keep our partnership with America strong…Europe gives us weight and 
strength…Europe should be far more confident about its potential…Our partner-
ship with America and our membership of the EU are precisely suited to Britain. 
For that reason, it would be insane…for us to give up either relationship.”
20 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel echoed these sentiments: 
“NATO has impressively proven it is confronting the changed world situa-
tion…The threat to our security can no longer be geographically isolated to-
day…NATO is and remains the anchor of German security and defense policy. It 
is and will remain the central venue for the transatlantic security dialogue…A re-
liable transatlantic relationship is absolutely indispensable…not only to us but 
also to the United States of America…A strong America is in the interest of 
Europe. A strong EU, with the will to actively shape policies and the readiness 
and ability also to implement them, is in the interest of America…[It is] our aim 
to intensify cooperation between NATO and the EU.”
21 
At the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, NATO’s Secretary 
General reopened the debate regarding a new strategic concept for NATO 
 
19  Stefan Fröhlich, “Euro-Atlantic Enlargement and Its Implications for ESDP,” in 
New Stimulus or Integration Backlash: EU Enlargement and Transatlantic Rela-
tions, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 7 July 2004. 
20   Tony Blair, “Speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet,” 13 November 2006, 
<http://www.pm. gov.uk/output/Page10409.asp>. Current British Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown's recent intervention to rein in UK Foreign Secretary, David Mili-
band, in his first major EU speech, forcing Miliband to delete any reference to 
Sarkozy's proposal to establish an "EU military capabilities charter", would seem to 
indicate that policy under Brown will not change substantively from traditional 
British policy as enunciated by Blair. Cf. "EU must improve military capabilities," 
EU Observer, 16 November 2007. 
21   Angela Merkel, “Stengthening NATO’s Ability to Act,” <http://www.germany. 
info/relaunch/politics/speeches/1003006.html>. NATO and the EU: Managing the Frozen Conflict 
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which he wants to see developed by the NATO summit in 2009, NATO’s 
60
th anniversary, and he emphasized that the Alliance needs to improve its 
cooperation with the European Union.
22  This can be seen as a great oppor-
tunity to end the “frozen conflict.”  Differences, however, have already 
arisen as France attempted to “block or water down” any political discus-
sions within NATO at the Riga Summit in the fall of 2006. By slowing 
down discussions and hampering debate within NATO, France has contin-
ued to pursue a strategy that uses the EU as a tool to weaken NATO. Guil-
laume Parmentier argues: 
“NATO is too dominated by the US to serve European purposes, and too multilat-
eral for the most powerful country, which wants to act without shackles when it 
feels its security is at stake. NATO needs to change: it is time to give the Euro-
pean Union (and not only its member countries) a voice within the organization. 
This would oblige Europeans to face up squarely to their responsibilities in the se-
curity field, including financially. Militarily NATO would also greatly benefit by 
giving added responsibilities…to Europeans.”
23 
Thus, while some remain optimistic that a further transformation of NATO 
with a new strategic concept can improve its relations with the EU, it is 
evident that many ideological and political obstacles remain. 
Fundamental NATO and ESDP Policies and Capabilities 
The recent evolution of ESDP has been a process of slow, incremental im-
plementation of policies with sudden great leaps forward spurred by exter-
nal shocks. Indeed, the history of ESDP reveals a pattern of external EU 
relations where events outside of the structural European sphere were per-
ceived as potential threats needing a European answer independent of US 
policies or goals. Some of these events, such as the wars in the Balkans and 
the Kosovo crisis, motivated EU member states, including Great Britain, to 
strengthen their ESDP capabilities to protect their own security interests in 
cases where they fundamentally differed with US transatlantic policies or 
where the US was not interested in playing a major role in Europe. This 
 
22   At the Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2006, German Chancellor Merkel 
first opened the debate when she called for a new Strategic Concept for NATO to 
replace the outdated pre-9/11 Strategic Concept from 1999. Peter Hughes 
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was a major breakthrough for the EU as a security and defense institution. 
However, after the St. Malo declaration and the incorporation of the Pe-
tersberg Tasks, it very quickly became evident that the ESDP still lacked 
essential institutional structures and operational capabilities and would 
need to work closely with NATO. In 2003 100,000 European troops (in-
cluding NATO, EU, and national missions) were deployed abroad, but they 
were dependent upon external resources for transport, support, and protec-
tion. The NATO-EU Berlin Plus agreement in 2003 was a step in the right 
direction for coordinating capabilities with the developing EU-ESDP insti-
tutions in order to prevent duplication. Since then, however, the process has 
stagnated, exacerbating the current “frozen conflict”. 
In terms of NATO and EU military capabilities, duplication in an area 
where funding is already scarce for many European states, is a primary US 
concern regarding the further development of ESDP. NATO’s Response 
Force and the EU Battle Groups look remarkably similar on paper as 
quickly deployable crisis management forces, albeit at different levels of 
capability, and the US questions how EU-NATO members can pursue their 
commitments to both institutions without leaving both forces hollow. The 
potential dilemma and the dimensions of the problem are evident in a Ger-
man federal ministry of defense Rüstungsabteilung study conducted in 
2007, which purportedly concludes that ESDP initiatives would duplicate 
more than 80% of existing NATO capabilities, a startling figure given the 
lack of resources European countries are currently willing to make avail-
able to NATO. Additionally, the opening of a new EU military operations 
headquarters on 13 June 2007 under the European Defense Agency (EDA) 
has raised further concerns about duplication with NATO’s Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, namely 
that both will perform the same exact tasks of planning, overseeing, and 
commanding military operations.
24  Javier Solana had tried to dispel this 
notion emphasizing that the center’s strength is its ability to carry out inte-
grated civil-military operations:  
 
23   “Europe Must Play a Bigger Part in NATO,” Financial Times, 17 March 2006. 
24   “EU Opens Military Ops HQ,” Defense News, 18 June 2007, 34. NATO and the EU: Managing the Frozen Conflict 
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“We have an arrangement with NATO..., but we also have a mandate to plan and 
operate EU-led missions and we need the capability to do that. But it doesn’t 
mean at all that this is undermining NATO. It is not a question of competition, but 
a good division of labor since NATO missions do not include a civilian ele-
ment.”
25 
Since the beginning of 2003, the EU has launched and led around fifteen 
military or civil-security missions, even if modest in scale, including police 
missions, around the world from Europe to Africa (in the Congo) to Indo-
nesia. In terms of EU military peacekeeping operations, the most specific 
and recent cases where the EU has demonstrated a capacity for relatively 
sizeable and demanding missions have been in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In 2003, the NATO Op-
eration Allied Harmony in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
handed over its responsibilities to the EU and became EU Operation Con-
cordia; and in 2004, the EU Operation Althea replaced the NATO Stabili-
zation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Twenty-two old and new EU 
member states participated in this mission, along with all EU applicants 
except for Croatia, and a number of other non-EU countries, such as Chile, 
Canada, New Zealand, and Morocco. Both Concordia and Althea represent 
the largest operations within the scope of the ESDP and both have been 
successful in terms of cooperating with NATO. 
To sum up, there are several fundamental policy and capability issues fac-
ing NATO-ESDP relations, including geopolitical burden sharing, a 
framework for operational collaboration, funding, and resource and capa-
bility planning. At this point in both institutions’ ongoing development, 
there is no clear-cut division of labor between NATO and the EU geo-
graphically or functionally. Due to the aforementioned disagreements at the 
highest political levels, functional competition, rather than functional coop-
eration, continues to characterize the nature of NATO-ESDP relations. Al-
though NATO’s capabilities include high level force projection, they do not 
include the broad array of policies at the EU’s disposal. The EU, on the 
other hand, has neither the need nor the ability to rival NATO geographi-
cally or functionally. It does, however, seek to build up its own, fairly low 
 
25   ibid. Peter Hughes 
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level military capability so that it can be fully equipped to act as a security 
participant in the world. 
Within this context, a framework for basic operational collaboration has 
been set up through the Berlin Plus agreement. However, experts on both 
sides are already seeking ways around it, arguing that it has actually be-
come a hindrance to cooperation since it is only a one way agreement al-
lowing the EU to use NATO military capabilities. It does not work the 
other way, which has been termed “Berlin Plus in Reverse,” to give NATO 
access to EU civil-military capabilities. It also does not give much leeway 
for the EU to access NATO resources for any ESDP operations that are 
non-military in nature. Thus, after only four years Berlin Plus seems to be 
already outdated with major policy and operational shortcomings. At a re-
cent NATO conference one Greek official noted,  
“EU-NATO cooperation works very well on the ground but we cannot do our 
work to counter terrorism under Berlin Plus. This would be a disaster if the Tali-
ban understood this. While Berlin Plus was once a solution, it is now part of the 
problem regarding the fight against terrorism and the need for civil-military ap-
proaches to failed states and other crises.”
26 
In addition, Berlin Plus sought to reduce fears of duplication, but those 
fears have been realized with the development of separate rapid reaction 
forces, the NATO RF and the EU Battle Groups respectively. Indeed, in the 
field of resource and capability planning, fears of duplication continue to 
sour relations, especially after the development of the European Defense 
Agency. 
Without a “grand bargain,” an agreement at the highest political levels on 
the purposes and character of transatlantic security co-operation, there are 
no readily available solutions to these problems facing NATO-EU rela-
tions. Yet, as demonstrated through the successful handover of NATO mis-
sions to EU military operations Concordia and Althea and their 
achievements, it is evident that practical cooperation is taking place at cer-
tain levels of the relationship. With this in mind it is now relevant to assess 
the problem of Afghanistan to see if NATO and EU policies and capabili-
ties are actually functioning on the ground in a conflict that threatens both 
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the future of transatlantic security and the future nature, architecture, and 
role of the transatlantic security relationship. 
Test Case Afghanistan 
As institutions seeking to combat the new threats of the twenty-first cen-
tury, there is no better case study to analyze the success and compatibility 
of NATO and EU policies and capabilities and their prospects for the future 
than their current engagement in the conflict in Afghanistan.  
Since 2001 NATO has been in Afghanistan, and since 2003 it has been op-
erating all over the country outside of Kabul.
27 Under its UN-mandate 
NATO’s ISAF force engagement is designed to stabilize and reconstruct 
the country, to assign a civilian representative to work with the Afghan 
government and other international organizations to advance political-
military relations, and to develop a program of cooperation “concentrating 
on defense reform, defense institution-building and the military aspects of 
security sector reform.”  As ISAF Commander Lt. Gen. Richards notes, 
“ISAF's part in this process is to provide the security within which devel-
opment can take place.”
28 
There has been progress in reconstruction and development as ISAF engi-
neers help build critical infrastructure, such as roads and schools. However, 
as a military force, these tasks do not correspond well with the specialties 
and background training of the NATO forces, which are better put to use 
maintaining security and rooting out the Taliban insurgency. Moreover 
NATO is falling seriously short; its Alliance members are not meeting their 
commitments to provide the necessary troops needed to maintain stability. 
Stretched thin, the ISAF mission struggles to combat the major problem of 
increased insurgency in southern and eastern Afghanistan, the political and 
military re-emergence of the Taliban, increased casualties, both military 
and civilian, including Alliance partners and local Afghanis, and continued 
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poppy production and growth in the drug trade. Therefore, it needs the con-
tinued help and support of its European Alliance and EU partners for the 
ISAF mission to be successful. Speaking before the Riga Summit in No-
vember 2006, US Senator, and then Foreign Relations Committee Chair-
man, Richard Lugar warned, “If the most prominent alliance in modern 
history were to fail in its first operation outside of Europe due to a lack of 
will by its members, the efficacy of NATO and the ability to take joint ac-
tion against a terrorist threat would be called into question”.
29  This is the 
crux of the issue. The ISAF mission in Afghanistan clearly demonstrates 
that, despite NATO’s “Comprehensive Political Guidance” and other initia-
tives designed to reinvent and transform it, the Alliance’s capabilities in 
terms of funding and troops remains inadequate, made more so by the fail-
ure of nations to honor the agreements and obligations in place. As Michael 
Moran writes, the Alliance’s core problem is “the unwillingness of its 
European military forces to modernize their forces to commit them to over-
seas missions.”
30  
Despite the need for more troops in Afghanistan and urgent appeals from 
US President Bush and then British Prime Minister Blair at the 2006 Riga 
Summit, (and most recently by de Hoop Scheffer at the NATO ministerial 
meeting in October 2007) the Treaty countries have failed to commit the 
forces necessary to stabilize the country. This raises a central concern the 
US has with many of the European states, which are also working together 
on a common ESDP. Julian Lindley-French writes that the “fear of risk is 
the cancer in Europe’s security effort”.
31  If European nations are not will-
ing to supply troops without caveats on their use or are not willing to spend 
at least two percent of GDP on defense, then it will be extremely difficult 
for NATO or the EU to integrate and modernize their structures, capabili-
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ties, and forces.
32  Similarly, Simon Serfaty writes, “The allies cannot com-
plain of America’s leadership if they do not show a willingness to accept a 
larger share of the burdens associated with leadership, or complain of 
American reluctance to rely on NATO if the NATO allies are unable to 
produce the necessary forces for NATO action”.
33 
So what are the problems, especially with respect to Afghanistan?  Often 
the military and civilian capabilities are ready and prepared, but there is a 
demonstrated lack of political willingness in many European countries to 
act. Some attribute this failure to act to public opinion and the fact that a 
majority of people do not view the conflict in Afghanistan as having any 
direct bearing on their future security. Thus, many European countries 
place caveats on how, when, and where their troops can be used and de-
ployed. NATO has been able to overcome some of these caveats, e.g. gain-
ing German Tornado aircraft. However, this is a long and tedious process 
when NATO requires swift action from its Alliance partners. After a 
NATO ministerial meeting in October 2007, de Hoop Scheffer noted that 
there are still substantial gaps in the forces promised by Alliance members. 
He made a plea for national governments to explain to their publics why 
the mission in Afghanistan is so important, saying, “The security of Af-
ghanistan is directly linked to your and my security and that is the message 
we have not yet been able to get across.”
34 
This is but one problem that needs solving, and as CSIS’ Julianne Smith 
points out with regard to troop levels, it is important to note “that even a 
doubling of the NATO force in Afghanistan would fail to guarantee suc-
cess.”
35  Thus, it is important that NATO seeks to pursue stabilization and 
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development efforts in tandem with the EU, which can especially provide 
valuable assistance in terms of the development tasks required in Afghani-
stan. Since 2001 the EU has been active on the ground in Afghanistan pro-
viding development assistance and working with other international 
organizations on reconstruction projects. The EU’s Special Representative 
to Afghanistan, Francesc Vendrell, works together with the Afghanis to 
develop democratic political institutions and advises the EU on the course 
of its Afghan policy. In addition, the EU has pledged €8.7 billion ($11.6 
billion) over the next five years, which, added on to the $10.3 billion in ex-
ternal aid that Afghanistan received from 2001-2006, will greatly aid future 
reconstruction efforts.
36 
Financial contributions alone, however, are not sufficient for success in 
Afghanistan. Given the limitations of joint EU action in matters of foreign 
and security policy, EU member states and the European Commission have 
individually focused on specific areas where they could be of help, e.g., 
counter-narcotics (the UK), judicial reform and training (Italy), and, until 
the summer, police training (Germany). However, the EU can do so much 
more, and as Smith points out,  
“While the EU and nation-specific contributions are laudable, they are increas-
ingly considered insufficient. Afghans, Non-Governmental Organizations, NATO, 
and an array of international partners on the ground have repeatedly called for 
more aid, faster and expanded training, and an increase in the EU’s civilian pres-
ence.”
37 
As the Taliban’s “spring offensive” gained momentum and carried over 
into the summer months with increased violence and casualties, these calls 
for support from NATO only grew louder. Julianne Smith elaborates, 
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“Given its current toolbox of capabilities, international experience, and in-
stitutional strengths, the EU should assume a much stronger leadership role 
in Afghanistan.”
38  Indeed, recently the EU-ESDP has taken on more re-
sponsibility and assumed a stronger leadership role in Afghanistan by start-
ing its civil police mission, “Eupol Afghanistan,” in cooperation with 
NATO where, since 17 June 2007, it has taken over the training and devel-
opment of a professional Afghani police force.
39 
A demonstrated initiative on the part of the EU through the ESDP could 
well produce substantial progress in Afghanistan. A stronger EU civilian 
presence on the ground could work directly with the local population and 
supply it with the resources it needs for judicial reform, the establishment 
of the rule of law, agriculture, health, education, police training, and recon-
struction. As NATO works with the Afghans to stabilize their country, the 
EU could help Afghans simultaneously develop a reconstruction strategy 
and use benchmarks to ensure that progress is actually made.
40 
While allowing NATO to take care of the military peacekeeping efforts, the 
EU could use its capabilities to perform a coordinating role in reconstruc-
tion efforts.  
“Coordination is a problem on multiple levels—among the hundreds of NGOs, 
government agencies, and international institutions operating on the ground; 
among EU member states; among the array of EU institutions contributing to the 
rebuilding efforts; and between military and civilian actors.”
41   
In a move which would be especially beneficial for NATO, the EU has the 
potential to act as a body which could “communicate, coordinate, and con-
struct common, or at least complementary strategies” between its own 
member states, NATO, and other non-EU actors, thereby reducing waste 
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and duplication of efforts. Thus, in cooperation with NATO, the EU could 
provide an overarching framework for individual projects to be part of a 
single, common policy. By doing this the EU could set goals, and member 
states or donors, from inside and even outside the EU, that wanted to help 
with reconstruction could contribute through a strategic framework in spe-
cific areas the EU has identified.  
For such efforts to be successful, however, they require political leadership. 
That has been lacking; the excuse has been little European public support 
for, or understanding of, the conflict in Afghanistan. The EU and its mem-
ber states need to demonstrate the importance of an increased role in Af-
ghanistan. If European political leaders believe that failure in Afghanistan 
is a direct threat to their own security, then it is incumbent upon them to act 
and educate the public. A greater understanding of the many positive things 
the EU and NATO stabilization and reconstruction forces are doing in Af-
ghanistan could garner public support since a majority of Europeans do not 
support strategies that focus solely on military action. It is equally impera-
tive that the European troops already in Afghanistan as part of the ISAF 
mission remain there to maintain peace and stabilization. At the same time, 
an increased EU role in reconstruction efforts will give national leaders po-
litical arguments to increase their financial, civilian and military contribu-
tions, without appearing to be part of America’s “tool box”. It is no less 
imperative that political leaders promote European understanding and pub-
lic support for the missions in Afghanistan. Finally, since NATO is often 
seen as one of the “tools” the US uses to carry out its foreign policy, the 
EU, now usually perceived as a fair and honest broker, could help restore 
international legitimacy to the missions in Afghanistan and reemphasize 
their importance. Thus, by asserting itself in Afghanistan, the EU could 
dramatically increase its voice in foreign and security policy and position 
itself to play a greater role in security and defense. Although the EU has 
achieved worldwide international respect for its development assistance 
programs, it has yet to achieve success coordinating an effective ESDP. 
Afghanistan provides an opportunity. As Smith puts it, “Member states and NATO and the EU: Managing the Frozen Conflict 
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EU officials often trumpet the EU’s soft power potential. What better way 
to put those words into practice than by helping to rebuild Afghanistan?”
42 
Success in Afghanistan is vital for Western security and transatlantic rela-
tions. By working together there, NATO and the EU can demonstrate their 
commitment to one another and show their unity in combating the common 
security threats of the twenty-first century. Perhaps by working together on 
practical civil military levels performing the tasks where they have a com-
parative advantage, it is suggested that NATO and the EU might begin to 
break out of the deadlock and paralysis in order to be able to achieve genu-
ine cooperation and compatibility. That is perhaps the optimistic point of 
view. Julian Lindley-French, on the other hand, might more accurately de-
scribe the situation in Afghanistan:  
“Afghanistan is at a crunch point. Put simply, either the 37 countries currently en-
gaged in the reconstruction of Afghanistan…recognise and stand up to the enor-
mity of the challenge (and the opportunity) or the West’s signature mission will 
fail at the start of the new strategic age. Those are the stakes…Today, there are 
not enough resources…And, even at 35,000 strong, there are not enough forces 
…Ultimately, it is not the Taliban, al-Qaeda or the Pashtun who are threatening 
the West with failure…Rather, it is the refusal of political leaders in the West to 
recognise the importance of success, the full implications of failure and invest ac-
cordingly. Moreover, it is failure that is leading inexorably to the coalescence of 
Taliban, al-Qaeda and Pashtun interests…Afghanistan-lite represents a collective 
failure of strategic imagination in the West. In addition, Afghanistan has become 
the place where the over-militarised American war on terror has come face to face 
with the overcivilianised and locally focused anachronism of contemporary Euro-
pean peacekeeping…unlike Iraq the West is engaged in Afghanistan as the legiti-
mate West and if it loses there then the whole concept of the West as the 
cornerstone security power in the new grand strategic architecture will be dealt the 
most searing of blows.”
43 
Spelling out the situation in Afghanistan in plain terms, Lindley-French’s 
basic message is to remind the transatlantic security order, especially the 
Europeans, that the West is not in Afghanistan “out of altruism” – most 
leaders seem to believe that vital security interests are at stake.
44  Region-
ally and globally, there would be major adverse consequences if NATO 
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and EU efforts end in division and failure and could possibly spell the end 
of NATO as a transatlantic security organization. 
The Future: Synergy in ESDP-NATO Transatlantic Rela-
tions? 
It is evident that both NATO and the ESDP are in a process of transition 
and are evolving. The question becomes how the two sides can move be-
yond their rhetoric to make their public pronouncements a political and op-
erational reality, especially with respect to the current and very serious 
situation in Afghanistan. 
NATO’s Secretary General, de Hoop Scheffer, has laid out five points, 
small steps “geared to the operational reality,” where he believes that the 
successful implementation of these measures will get ESDP-NATO transat-
lantic relations out of the “unsatisfactory status quo…out of the demarca-
tion logic of the ‘90s and into the model of cooperation for the 21
st 
century.”
45  1) As a an example for future operations, after achieving a 
smooth transition in Bosnia, the parameters of cooperation of NATO’s 
military tasks and the EU’s policing tasks in Kosovo must be harmonized. 
2) A concerted approach by the international community is needed in Af-
ghanistan. A greater EU commitment in the training of police and judges 
will go a long way in helping stabilize that country. 3) Despite the Berlin 
Plus framework and the establishment of the European Defense Agency, 
“the danger of duplication and inadequate interoperability remains.”  There 
needs to be a far-reaching dialogue about the harmonization of both institu-
tions’ military transformations with a special emphasis on the training and 
certification of the NATO Response Force and the EU Battle Groups. 4) 
Although hindered by the Turkey-Cyprus dispute, there must be a frank, 
open, and comprehensive dialogue and exchange of ideas at all levels be-
tween NATO and the EU on issues ranging from proliferation to energy 
security to defense against terrorism. 5) A dialogue regarding the enlarge-
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ment processes of both institutions (NATO Partnership for Peace and EU 
Neighborhood Policy) is needed.
46 
ESDP-NATO transatlantic relations are and should be complementary as 
de Hoop Scheffer argues in the concluding remarks of one speech,  
“Strategic partnership between NATO and the EU has never been more important 
than it is today. The challenges of our times demand a comprehensive approach to 
security, in which military and civil means are employed together and in a coordi-
nated way. There is no stronger civil player than the European Union. And there is 
no stronger military alliance than NATO. There is therefore in my view only one 
conclusion – we must finally get serious with the strategic partnership!”
47 
At the same time, de Hoop Scheffer acknowledges that there is not much 
more he or his counterpart in the EU, Javier Solana, can do at this point:  
“[New NATO-EU institutional links] deserve the highest attention, but it is a 
question that Solana and I cannot solve…We need higher-level resolution of this 
problem. And it is something I will fight for as long as I occupy this position. The 
challenges of Afghanistan and Kosovo demand that NATO and the EU redouble 
their effort to forge a strategic relationship.”
48 
The EU and NATO display a high degree of consensus regarding funda-
mental policy objectives, values, and threat perceptions but still disagree on 
the best framework for moving forward. Given their different operational 
and institutional capabilities it is very much in the transatlantic security and 
defense interest that the two institutions deepen their cooperation and be-
come as complementary as possible. 
Having celebrated the 50
th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome in March 
2007, and the 60
th anniversary of the Marshall Plan in June 2007, NATO 
and the EU are at a unique crossroads where this year of reflection about a 
common transatlantic past could propel them to move forward in the com-
plementary fashion that was so vital for bringing a peaceful end to the Cold 
War. As Simon Serfaty argues, there is 
“an urgent need for action: to renew the institutional core of the Euro-Atlantic 
partnership, and to re-cast Europe and its relations with the United States, as well 
as NATO and its relations with the EU, into an ever-closer Euro-Atlantic Com-
munity that regroups the EU, NATO, and the United States into a cohesive and 
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capable We that integrates substantively and procedurally the separate dialogues 
that occur within the EU and with the United States, as well as within NATO and 
with the EU.”
49 
This hopeful observation promoting an ever-closer transatlantic relation-
ship, and reminiscent of the wording of the Treaties of Rome, which sought 
to bring the peoples of Europe together in an “ever closer union,” is both 
possible and desirable and would be in mutual security interest. In theory 
ESDP-NATO transatlantic relations are complementary. However, in prac-
tice the Franco-American ideological divide remains. The election of new 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who likes America and has shown a 
willingness to discuss bringing France back in NATO, could lead to a criti-
cal shift in French policy, but this remains to be seen.  
The conflict in Afghanistan will ultimately determine the nature and future 
of the transatlantic security framework. Unfortunately, no conclusions can 
be derived from the current situation on the ground. There is reason for op-
timism that NATO and the EU can work together practically at operational 
levels, perhaps leading to a breakthrough in relations at higher political 
levels. On the other hand, the conflict there could test the strength of the 
bonds of the Alliance and ultimately pull it apart. For the time being then, 
with no apparent resolutions coming in the foreseeable future, NATO will 
retain its role as the primary forum for transatlantic security and defense 
and the EU will continue to seek greater capabilities and an expanded role 
for its ESDP. Through an evolving dialogue and the dedication of de Hoop 
Scheffer and Solana, the NATO-EU relationship can strengthen the ESDP-
transatlantic relationship, eventually making it one of synergy rather than 
competition. Afghanistan is the test case. It is a test case first and foremost 
that will shape and define the future of NATO. It is also a test case for the 
future of the ESDP and whether it and NATO can act together in synergy 
to advance the security interests of the West. 
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